Tensions are escalating in the Horn of Africa as Ethiopia has publicly accused Eritrea of actively preparing for war. This alarming assertion was made by Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos in a letter addressed to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres. In his correspondence, Timothewos accused Eritrea of “funding, mobilizing, and directing” various armed groups operating within Ethiopian territory, particularly the Fano militia, known for its ethnically Amhara identity. Furthermore, he alleged that Eritrea is collaborating with a hardline faction of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to incite violence in northern Ethiopia.
Timothewos’s warning was unequivocal: if Eritrea’s actions persist, Ethiopia would be left with no choice but to respond militarily. He noted, “The Ethiopian [National] Defence Force has adopted a defensive posture and tried to contain the situation… However, it should be noted that the policy is not one of indefinite restraint.” Such statements highlight the precarious state of affairs and the thin veneer of peace that currently exists in the region.
In a swift counter-response, Eritrean Minister of Information Yemane Ghebremeskel labeled the Ethiopian letter as “duplicity in its extreme,” accusing Ethiopia of engaging in “reckless and provocative saber-rattling.” This back-and-forth illustrates the deeply entrenched hostilities and mutual distrust that have characterized the relationship between the two nations.
Ethiopia is still in the aftermath of a brutal civil war, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands and displaced millions. Although the conflict officially concluded in 2022 with the signing of the Pretoria Agreement, peace remains elusive. The disarmament and reintegration of fighters is lagging, and the TPLF has fractured into rival factions competing for control. Meanwhile, the Fano militia continues its armed resistance against the government, adding another layer of complexity to the already volatile situation.
Analyst Gelila Enbaye observes that Eritrea’s actions seem to embody a “spoiler” role in the ongoing conflict dynamics. By supporting both the Fano and segments of the TPLF, Eritrea appears to be operating under the tactical philosophy that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” This underscores a tense interplay where historical grievances and regional ambitions threaten to reignite conflict.
Furthermore, Ethiopia’s quest to regain access to the Red Sea Port of Assab adds fuel to the fire. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1991, Ethiopia has been landlocked, and recent aggressive rhetoric from Ethiopian leaders suggests a growing impatience. In a notable post on social media, the Ethiopian Army expressed readiness to “pay any price” to secure control of the strategically vital port of Assab, indicating a potential flashpoint for renewed hostilities.
Dr. Michael Woldemariam, an associate professor specializing in the Horn of Africa, emphasizes that the war of words between Ethiopia and Eritrea signals a possible “inflection point.” As tensions intensify, so does the risk of armed conflict, which could devastate the region once more. He observes, “The tension between them has become much more explicit, so that certainly suggests that we should be increasingly alarmed by the trajectory of tensions between the two countries.”
The lack of independent journalistic reporting in the region makes it challenging to ascertain the concrete military preparations of both nations. Rumors about troop mobilization near Assab and alleged arms purchases have circulated, but these claims remain unverified, which only heightens concerns about transparency and accountability in the region.
Observers are particularly worried about the potential consequences of renewed warfare in Tigray, where, according to a 2025 U.N. report, approximately 878,000 individuals remain internally displaced. Dr. Woldemariam warns that an escalation of violence could lead to catastrophic humanitarian conditions. “What’s particularly concerning about a war in northern Ethiopia involving Eritrea is how fragile humanitarian conditions already are,” he notes. Adding armed conflict to the equation could result in the collapse of basic services and trigger further waves of migration.
Moreover, there is apprehension that if conflict breaks out, it could become intractable. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea may resort to arming various militias and seeking external alliances, complicating the dynamics even further. Michael points out parallels to the Sudanese civil war, where external powers such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates may become embroiled in a proxy struggle, making peaceful resolutions increasingly elusive.
“This is likely to be a multisided conflict with a bunch of different parties, and the more hands you have in the conflict, the more difficult it is to resolve,” he concludes. Given the historical context and existing tensions in the region, such a scenario could have dire implications not only for Ethiopia and Eritrea but for the broader Horn of Africa.
