The Blogs: An Overlooked Ally: The Case for U.S. Engagement with Somaliland | Gulaid Yusuf Idaan

Abstract

The Bab el-Mandeb strait is a crucial maritime passage, accounting for about twelve percent of all global trade. Situated where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden, this narrow chokepoint is vital for energy supplies and commerce that underpin globalization. Recent years have seen this strategic waterway become heavily militarized, with military installations from the United States, China, France, Japan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates increasingly populating its shores. However, the effectiveness of U.S. strategy in this vital region is hampered by diplomatic frameworks that hinder its partnerships and access.

Why the Region Matters

The Red Sea has emerged as a focal point in the struggle for global influence, particularly between the U.S. and China. As both countries vie for control over key maritime chokepoints and port infrastructure, the stakes are incredibly high. The U.S. recognizes that maintaining influence here is vital to its global strategy and for countering China’s expanding reach.

China’s establishment of a naval base in Djibouti in 2017 significantly enhances its operational capabilities, enabling monitoring and influence over traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Additionally, substantial investments by Chinese state-owned enterprises in regional ports reflect a broader strategy blending economic interests with military logistics.

In contrast to U.S. efforts focused primarily on Djibouti, China’s ambitions extend toward Republic of Somaliland. With 740 kilometers of coastline and deep-water port facilities at Berbera, Somaliland offers China strategic advantages that could include control over maritime routes on both sides of the Bab el-Mandeb strait.

The Strategic Blind Spot

U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa largely rests on outdated frameworks originally designed to address Somalia’s collapse in the 1990s. As a result, there exists a strategic incoherence in how the U.S. engages with this complex region. Despite the Federal Government of Somalia’s limited authority—largely confined to Mogadishu—this recognized government receives full international diplomatic support, which unintentionally isolates the Republic of Somaliland, a de facto independent state since 1991.

While China, Turkey, and other nations are advancing their partnerships with Somaliland, the U.S. remains locked in a diplomatic inertia that neglects the on-the-ground reality of governance and stability in Somaliland. This failure to engage is problematic and allows competitor nations to secure alliances that undermine U.S. interests.

Republic of Somaliland’s Strategic Value

The Republic of Somaliland holds significant potential for partnership with the United States across several strategic dimensions:

1. Operational Redundancy: The port of Berbera, developed under UAE management, offers deep-water capacity vital for naval operations. By recognizing Somaliland, the U.S. can secure an alternative logistics node, reducing reliance on the concentrated American presence in Djibouti.

2. Burden-Sharing Partnership: Somaliland’s security forces have successfully maintained territorial integrity and countered threats from Al-Shabaab. The U.S. needs partnerships that require minimal resources, and Somaliland fits that bill perfectly.

3. Democratic Alignment: Somaliland has established a stable governance framework, conducting multiple competitive elections. This stands in stark contrast to many of its regional counterparts and could enable better alignment with American democratic values and strategic interests.

4. Geographic Positioning: With its coastline and strategic location near the Bab el-Mandeb, Somaliland plays a critical role in the broader continental strategies linking maritime control to regional influence.

The Consequences of U.S. Inaction

Failing to engage with the Republic of Somaliland leads to several potential costs for the United States:

• Chinese Encirclement: Without active American involvement, interests in Somaliland could well fall into China’s sphere of influence. A Chinese-controlled Berbera port could allow for comprehensive monitoring of maritime traffic and leverage over regional trade.

• Operational Vulnerability: Continued reliance on Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti without alternatives creates a significant risk, especially as regional alliances are formed without U.S. consultation. This diminishes future American leverage.

• Alliance Erosion: Inability to recognize Somaliland undermines American credibility and leadership. Recent recognitions by Israel of Somaliland indicate a shift toward recognizing functional partners rather than adhering to outdated diplomatic frameworks.

• Security Risks: The uncertainty surrounding Somalia’s territorial integrity leaves gaps that groups like Al-Shabaab exploit. The U.S.’s inability to operate with the governing forces in Somaliland limits effective counterterrorism options.

What the United States Should Do

To align its diplomatic objectives with its strategic requirements, the United States should adopt a phased approach toward engaging with Republic of Somaliland:

1. Increase Diplomatic Engagement: Establish a formal liaison office to facilitate dialogue and incorporate Somaliland into strategic planning frameworks related to maritime security.

2. Expand Maritime Security Cooperation: Initiate joint security planning for Berbera port, ensuring alignment with American military needs while reducing dependency on Djibouti.

3. Support Infrastructure Development: Channel American resources into enhancing Berbera’s capacity and governance structures, positioning Somaliland as a counterweight to Chinese influence.

4. Move Toward Recognition: Gradually recognize Somaliland as a crucial partner, addressing the regional dynamics at play and emphasizing the U.S. interest in preventing Chinese encirclement.

The Strategic Conclusion

The U.S. finds itself at a crossroads in the Horn of Africa, facing unique challenges that require a nuanced approach to partnerships and recognition. The geographic, political, and security landscape is both dynamic and multifaceted, demanding a re-evaluation of the frameworks currently in place. By engaging with the Republic of Somaliland, the U.S. can secure critical interests in the Red Sea and avoid ceding ground to rival powers. Each year of hesitation further entrenches adversarial positions and complicates U.S. strategic options.